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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on a series of experiments designed to 
explore the so-called "information overload" hypothesis. We generally 
find that our subjects do quite well at screening out irrelevant 
information. Further, we find that a key element determining the 
quality of choices made by our subjects is the number of "salient" 
attributes, not just the number of attributes for which information is 
provided. Weak evidence is found which suggests a form of overload 
might occur when the number of salient dimensions is high and 
information is given on all of them. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of these results on the disclosure controversy. 
CONSUMER CHOICE AND INFORMATION : NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD HYPOTHESIS 
David M. Grether and Louis L. Wilde 
I, INTRODUCTION 
The world of the modern consumer is filled with decisions. A 
dazzling array of products and services confronts the consumer at every 
turn. In addition, the consumer has available, sometimes without any 
apparent choice in the matter, a seemingly unlimited amount of 
information regarding these products and services. While some might 
argue that more information is always better from the consumers' point 
of view, the suggestion that more information might be detrimental to 
consumers has begun to be taken quite seriously. For example, one 
argument in favor of simplification presented during the recent 
congressional debates over revising the Truth-in-Lending Act was based 
entirely on it. As a Governor of the Federal Reserve System put it : 
The total present disclosure requirements are simply too 
extensive to permit effective use by the vast majority of 
consumers. This view is based in part upon • • •  advice that the 
mass of information now provided may produce a kind of 
"information overload" that overpowers many consumers and renders 
the entire disclosure statement a forbidding and incomprehensible 
document, Indeed, behavioral research suggests that when 
confronted with more than a few "bits " of information , consumers 
cease to read or retain .fil!Y. of the material offered. (Jackson , 
1 977 , p. 4) . 
That the behavioral research literature indeed supports these 
conclusions is not obvious, In fact , very little work related to the 
2 
particular form of "information overload" referred to by Mr. Jackson 
has been done. The original notion of information overload was related 
to information acquisition, not final choices. Bettman , for example , 
reports that "several researchers have argued that as task difficulty 
(measured as the total amount of information , or information load) 
increases, there will first be increases in search, but then eventually 
decreases as too high an information load is imposed 11 (1 97 9 ,  P • 1 26 )  • 
He sites Schroder, Driver and Streufert (1 96 7 ) , Streufert , Suedfeld , 
and Driver (1 965)  and Sieber and Lanzetta (1 964) in support of this 
view.I "Information overload" in these papers refers to the fact that 
information acquisition eventually decreases as the total amount of 
information available passes some critical level. Of course this does 
not directly imply the quality of decisions gets worse--that depends on 
the nature of the information and the nature of the choice task.2 
Studies which directly test the information overload hypothesis 
in a consumer choice environment have been conducted by Jacoby and his 
associates (Jacoby, Speller and Kohn , 1974;  Jacoby, Speller and 
Berning, 1 974) . These authors report that "based upon considerable 
evidence [an alternate view to the 'more is better' position] maintains 
that there are finite limits to the ability of human beings to 
assimilate and process information during any given unit of time, and 
that once these limits are surpassed, behavior tends to become confused 
and dysfunctional." Studies cited to support this conclusion include 
Broadbent (197 1 ) , Driver and Streufert (196 9 ) , Miller (1956 ) and a 
number of others (see the references in Jacoby, Speller and Berning, 
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1 974) , "Information overload" in this latter work refers to the 
emergence of confused and dysfunctional behavior as the total amount of 
information available passes some critical level. While the terms 
"confused" and "dysfunctional" are somewhat imprecise, this definition 
appears to be stronger than Bettman's definition because it implicitly 
links the reduction in information acquisition to the quality of 
decisions . In fact, the evidence that this strong version of 
information overload exists is quite limited, and the conclusions drawn 
from these studies have been severely criticized ( Russo , 1 974;  Wilkie , 
1 974;  Summers , 1 974;  see also Jacoby, 1 97 7 ; Jacoby, Speller, and 
Berning , 1 975 for replies) ,  
Jacoby and his associates conducted a number of experiments all 
based on a common design. First, each subject was interviewed to 
identify his or her "ideal" brand of some specified product, Further , 
subjective weights associated with the importance of each attribute of 
the product were elicited. These were used to provide a base against 
which accuracy could be measured, Next , each subject was given a 
number of brands from which to choose (4, 8 ,  1 2 ,  or 1 6 ) , each brand 
being described by a number of attributes (2, 4 ,  or 6 ) .  The objective 
given each subject was to evaluate the information provided and choose 
the "best" brand in the set. The "best" brand was defined as the brand 
least distant from the "ideal" brand, where distance was measured 
linearly using the attribute weights elicited at the outset of the 
experiment, Using the product of the number of brands and the number 
of attributes ( i.e. , total "bits" )  as the measure of the information 
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load, Jacoby and his associates concluded that "providing substantial 
amounts of package information can result in poorer purchase decisions" 
( Jacoby,  Speller , and Kohn , 1 974,  p .  40 ) ,  and that increasing the 
information load tends to produce "dysfunctional consequences in terms 
of the consumer's ability to pick the brand which was best for him" 
( Jacoby , Speller, and Berning, 1 974,  p .  6 ) .  
While the basic experimental design can itself be criticized , 
Staelin and Payne (197 6 )  reanalyzed the results of these experiments , 
taking that design as given, and reached substantially different 
conclusions, By controlling for the effects of pure-chance in 
selecting the best brand as the number of brands increases ( Russo , 
1 974;  Wilkie , 1 974) and allowing for the possibility that there may not 
be an equal trade-off between brands and attributes ( Russo, 1 974) they 
find that "decision accuracy is a discontinuous monotonically 
increasing function with respect to the number of attributes per brand" 
(1976 , p .  1 89 ) , Thus they conclude that "more information is 
associated with more accuracy at least within small ranges" (1 97 6 ,  
P•  1 8 9 ) .  
Malhotra (1 982) employed a methodology similar to Jacoby's, 
Subjects rank order up to 25 houses (5 , 1 0 ,  1 5 ,  20 , or 25 ) each of 
which was described by 5 ,  1 0 ,  1 5 ,  20 , 25 attributes . Subjects choices 
were considered correct if the house chosen was the closest to their 
"ideal house" ( termed optimizing) or if the choice was one of the two 
closest ( termed satisficing), The results showed some decreased in accuracy 
with increasing information load, Malhotra corrected for chance and 
5 
reported that this made little difference . As with the earlier studies 
the analysis employed strong assumptions on the utility function of the 
subjects. Malhotra , Jain , and Lagakos ( 1 982 ) reanalyzed the data from 
the studies of Jacoby, et al ( 1 974a, 1 97 4b) and Scammon ( 1 977 ) and 
concluded that the evidence in those studies did not support the 
conclusion "that providing more information results in poorer purchase 
decisions , "  They report evidence that subjects in these experiments 
were capable of processing a large ( though finite) amount of 
information but questioned their motivation. 
It is fair, therefore, to say that the current state of the 
debate concerning the existence of information overload of the strong 
type--that which effects the quality of final choices--is unresolved. 
The purpose of this paper is to report on some new experimental 
evidence addressed to this issue . The results we present suggest that 
individuals are indeed quite good at making certain types of rather 
complicated decisions. While some tasks are more complicated than 
others , the degree of difficulty or "cognitive load" is not well 
described by simply counting the number of bits of information 
available , In fact , subjects in our experiments act as if they are 
quite capable of ignoring irrelevant information ,  Nevertheless,  we do 
find that a form of information overload may occur when the number of 
"salient" attributes is high and information is provided on all of 
them. In fact, one of our most important findings is the crucial role 
played by the distinction between the number of total attributes and 
the number of salient attributes , 
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The next section of this paper will briefly discuss our 
experimental methodology since it is substantially different from that 
found in the existing literature. Section III will summarize the 
results and Section IV will provide a further discussion of these 
results and their possible implications . 
I I ,  METHODOLOGY 
Section III will present some new experimental evidence dealing 
with the extent ( or existence) of the strong version of the information 
overload phenomenon . One goal in these experiments was to avoid some 
of the flaws in the methodology used by Jacoby and his associates . As 
noted in the introduction, their experiments have been thoroughly 
criticized in the consumer research literature so we will not repeat 
those arguments in this paper, 
All subjects were students at colleges and universities in 
Southern California : viz University of Southern California ( USC) ; 
Pasadena City College ( PCC) ; California State University at Northridge 
( CSUN) ; California State University at Fullerton ( CSUF) ; Occidental 
College ( Oxy) ; and University of California at Los Angeles ( UCLA) , 
Most subjects were recruited from economics and business classes 
although there were some history, sociology and anthropology students . 
In some cases subjects heard of the experiments by word-of-mouth and 
simply volunteered at the specified time and place . During recruitment 
subjects were told that there was to be an experiment in 
decisionmaking,  that we were economists from Caltech, that they would 
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be paid in cash (at least five dollars) ,  and that the experiment would 
take about an hour, 
Two aspects of our methodology require special comments : the 
use of sets of lotteries on prospects as items of choice and the use of 
dominance as a measure of performance ,  I n  most consumer research 
experiments of this type, actual or hypothetical products are used. 
Often the product is selected on the basis of its inherent interest to 
the subjects ( e.g., if the subject pool is business students, 
typewriters might be used as the product) ,  This can lead to 
confounding effects. For example, Scammon ( 1 97 7 ) ,  in an experiment 
related to information overload, exposed subjects to commercials for 
two brands of peanut butter, Skippy Peanut Butter and Koogle Peanut 
Butter Surprise, both of which included information on the nutritional 
content of the products, The data was manipulated so that Koogle 
dominated· Skippr on every dimension , Yet most subjects ( 88 percent) 
chose Skippy as "more nutritious" than Koogle on a subsequent 
questionnaire. Clearly, the choice of products had a dramatic impact 
on this result. 
For many purposes the use of real or fictitious brands is not 
only convenient but appropriate. In our experiments, since we wished to 
study choice behavior under varying amounts of information and 
complexity, we felt it important to control directly the amount of 
information available. Thus we wish to avoid "importing" information 
by using brand names or product types, etc, Hammerton ( 1 970)  gives an 
example where responses to a statistical decision problem are amazingly 
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insensitive to including or deleting logically necessary parts of the 
problem. The problem, which involved the probability of a diagnosis 
being correct, received very different responses, however, when it 
dealt with a medical diagnosis as opposed to a pronouncement of an auto 
mechanic , The situation is rather similar to that in Grether and Wilde 
( 1 984b ) in which we studied conjunctive choice rules, The experiments 
reported there involve decisions concerning rather complicated 
lotteries structured so that subjects were required to adopt some kind 
of conjunctive choice rule. The use of lotteries allowed us to 
manipulate the structure of the problem and to ensure that the 
dimensions or attributes of the "goods" were indeed independent. 
One has to decide which alternative "should" be chosen from any 
set of choice items--how can we evaluate performance? As mentioned in 
the introduction, in the experiments of Jacoby and his associates, this 
was resolved using a parametric representation of a multiattribute 
utility function and the determination of an "ideal" brand for each 
consumer, We choose to use an approach which requires weaker 
assumptions on the utility functions of participants. For all problems 
we use dominance as the criterion , Thus if there is a single dominant 
item in a choice set we shall treat choices of that element as correct, 
and choices of other elements (or indifference) as incorrect, In some 
cases there are several undominated elements and for these we treat the 
choice of any one of them as correct. 
The advertising literature seems to presume that consumers can 
easily recognize dominant products ( Wright and Barbour, 1 97 5 )  and, in 
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fact, our experiments confirm this using a design in which choice items 
are lotteries instead of hypothetical products. Most studies of 
consumer choice quite rightly avoid choices where there are dominated 
items , Since consumers do not choose them not much can be learned from 
including them except as a control to check confusion or lack of 
attention , A notable exception is Huber, Payne, and Puto ( 1 982 )  where 
dominated items were added to sets. That study concerned the dominance 
relation and its affect on choice ( see also Huber and Puto, 1 983 ) thus 
the presence of dominated items was necessary. 
The use of dominance is the rule rather than the exception in 
experimental economics as is the use of abstract commodities rather 
than known brands or goods. For a discussion of the methodology and 
its relevance for consumer reasearch, see Grether and Wilde ( 1 984a ) .  
A s  the information overload hypothesis is about failure of 
decisionmaking we felt it desirable to have a simple criterion for when 
a failure had occurred. 
We presented our subjects with two primary types of decision 
problems. In the first, items were simple lotteries with the number of 
outcomes serving as the number of attributes and the number of 
lotteries serving as the size of the choice set. Thus in Figure 1,  
Panel A represents three goods with three-attributes, Panel B 
represents four goods with five-attributes, and Panel C represents five 
goods with three-attributes. Whether or not the subjects view the 
items in Panel B as having five attributes or edit them as suggested by 
Kahneman and Tversky ( 1 979)  is not at issue. Each lottery shown in 
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Panel B requires more numbers i.e. pieces o f  information than does one 
in Panel A. In the second type of decision problem, items were 
compound lotteries--combinations of simple binary lotteries--with the 
number of simple binary lotteries serving as the number of attributes 
and the number of compound lotteries serving as the size of the choice 
set, Thus, Figure Al ( in the appendix ) represents two goods and three­
attributes, Figure A2 represents three goods and three-attributes, etc, 
Subjects were run together in groups of twenty to fifty 
depending upon how many volunteered for the experiments. Instructions 
were passed out and read aloud to the subjects. Subjects were allowed 
to ask questions, but other than that were to remain silent. The 
instructions described only one type of lottery problem. When subjects 
appeared to understand the problem, booklets of problems were passed out 
and subjects proceeded to make their choices at their own pace, When 
all subjects were finished the booklets were collected and if another 
type of decision problem was included in the session new instructions 
were passed out and the procedure repeated. Sometimes a decision 
problem would be presented to subjects twice during a session. In this 
case the problem would be presented in two separate booklets each 
containing several different problems of the same type. Within a given 
type of problem the larger, more complex problems were mixed in with 
the smaller, presumably easier ones , Thus in presentation the problems 
did not begin with the easier ones and precede to the harder ones ( or 
vice versa) .  This was done to guard against possible confounding 
effects of either experience or fatigue, but refers to order of 
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presentation only, Subjects could approach the problems in any order 
they chose and could change decisions to problems previously solved 
( within a given booklet) ,  Booklets varied in size from seven to around 
fifteen problems, At the beginning of each session one subject was 
selected to act as a monitor. The monitor's job was to generate the 
random numbers needed during the experiment by using a bingo cage. 
Subjects were informed at the beginning that one decision problem would 
be chosen at random by the monitor (using the bingo cage) , The set of 
lotteries constituting that problem would then be "run off" by the 
monitor ( again using the bingo cage) and subjects would be paid, in 
cash, on the basis of their choices for that problem, The bingo cage 
contained balls numbered 0, 1 ,  • •  , , 9 ,  Numbers 1 to 100 were generated by 
two draws with replacement ( treating double zero as 100 ) ,  Thus all 
probabilities used in lotteries were expressed operationally in terms 
of draws from the cage, For example, in Figure 1, Panel A, Item A is a 
lottery over five, twenty and ten dollar outcomes, with respective 
probabilities .28, ,36, and .36 ,  This was described simply by saying 
that if a number between one and twenty-eight was drawn the payoff 
would be five dollars, if a number between twenty-nine and sixty-four 
were drawn it would be twenty dollars, and the numbers sixty-five 
through one hundred would yield ten dollars. Thus we were able to 
avoid references to probabilities or similar terms which might have 
meant different things to different subjects. 
This process is tedious but important, First, the elements of 
the choice set are homogeneous in the sense that they do not induce 
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unique, subjective attitudes or valuations other than those related to 
their potential for generating a high cash reward. This eliminates 
confounding effects such as those described above in the Scammon study. 
Second, the use of the bingo cage reduced subjects' speculation as to 
what was "really going on" or that they might be being "tricked" in 
some fashion. Thus they could concentrate on the task at hand, 
Finally, regarding the use of cash incentive payments, Tversky and 
Kahneman ( 1 977, 1 981 ) have argued that these are not necessary and have 
cited several examples both from their own work and from others 
( Grether and Plott, 1 97 9 ) , We are aware of these arguments but have 
found, at least for some individual decisions involving uncertainty, 
that these payments seem to produce qualitatively different behavior 
( Grether, 1 9 81 ) ,  
III. RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the results of several experiments 
which were run under the methodology outlined in section I I ,4 Using 
compound lotteries we construct sets of lotteries with a fixed amount 
of information measured as "bits, 11 but which produce dramatically 
different responses; i.e., the proportion of "correct" choices vary 
significantly over choice problems with identical formats and amounts 
of information , For our subjects, at least, problems which caused 
incorrect responses were those which required the use of a large amount 
of information, not just those in which a large amount of information 
was presented, That is, our subjects act as if they are capable of 
ignoring unnecessary or irrelevant information. 
We consider first the set of decisions involving choices over 
simple lotteries, The order of the problems differed systematically 
across subjects but will be discussed here according to type. In the 
simplest, each choice set contained a single dominant element. The 
lotteries were displayed in a tabular form to facilitate comparisons, 
but in some cases subjects needed to perform minor calculations 
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(addition) in order to evaluate them. The results are shown in Table 1 
and the lotteries themselves are given, in their tabular form, in 
Figure 1. A large majority (approximately 5:1) chose the undominated 
item. Within the admittedly narrow range studied this result seems to 
be independent of the number of attributes to choose from or the number 
of values the lottery could pay--the number of its "attributes." There 
is some drop off in performance between the first two sets, but overall 
the effect is not statistically significant <x2(2) = 5.0) at the .OS
level. 
When the choice set included more than one undominated lottery, 
subjects generally avoided choosing from among the dominated lotteries, 
if any were present, but when presented with the same choice situation 
a second time a substantial fraction switched around among the 
undominated lotteries. This observation is consistent with observed 
stochastic choice behavior over sets for which there are no natural 
orders (Becker, DeGroot, and Marchak, 1963; McAlister, 1982). With 
these problems it is possible to study whether the structure of the 
dominance relations effects choice, as suggested by Huber, Payne 
Group 
UCLA 
Oxy 
PCC 
use 
CSUN 
CSUF 
Total 
Group 
UCLA 
Oxy 
PCC 
USC 
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TABLE 1: Choices from Sets with Unique Maximal Elements 
From a Set of Three Lotteries 
Dominant Item 
55 
46 
34 
40 
38 
42 
255a 
One of the 
Dominated Items 
or Indifferent 
13 
5 
9 
6 
2 
3 
From a Set of Four Lotteries 
Dominant Item 
49 
45 
27 
41 
34 
40 
236b 
One of the 
Dominated Items 
or Indifferent 
19 
6 
16 
6 
6 
5 
58b 
Repeated Choices 
Dominant 
56 
41 
31 
40 
From a set of Five Lotteries 
First Time 
Item 
One of the 
Dominated Items 
or Indifferent 
12 
10 
12 
7 
Second Time 
Dominant Item 
53 
46 
36 
43 
One of the 
Dominated Items 
or Indifferent 
15 
5 
6 
4 
Total (matching 
168c 178d 30d populations) 
CSUN 34 
CSUF 40 
Total 242e 
a, t (null hypothesis p 1/3) 19.4 
b. t (null hypothesis p 1/4) 21. 9 
c. t (null hypothesis p 1/5) 20.2 
d. t (null hypothesis p 1/5) 21.8 
e. t (null hypothesis p = 1/5) 24.7 
F!GURE I: Set of Lotteries Used in Constructing Table 1
PANEL A 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I $5 I ho I ho I l----�--1--------1--------1--------1 
I I 1-28 I 29-64 I 65-100 I I Item A I (28) I (36) I (36) I l--�----l�------l��----1--------1 
I I 1-30 I 31-60 I 61-100 I I Item B I (30) I (30) I (40) I 1--------1--------1--------1�------I 
I I 1-20 I 21-60 I 61-100 I I Item c I <20> I (40) I C40) I 
PANEL B 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I $5 I $20 I $5 I ho I $5 I 1--------1��--l�------l�------l--�----l�------I 
I I 1-7 I 8-43 I 44-50 I 51-86 I 87-100 I I Item A I (7) I (36) (7) I (36) (14) 1��----1�------1�------l�------1�------1--------1 
I I 1-8 I 9-38 I 39-45 I 46-85 I 86-100 I I Item B I C8l I C3ol I C7> (40) I C15) I 1�------1�------1--�----1�-----1�------1--------1 
I I 1-4 I 5-40 I 41-46 I 47-91 I 92-100 II Item c I (4) I (36) (6) I (45) (9) I l--------l�------l�------1--------1�------l--------I 
I 
It 0 
I 1-6 I 7-40 I 41-47 I 48-90 I 91-100 II em I (6) I (34) I (7) I (43) I (10) I 
PANEL C 
Choose one of the following items: 
I $5 I ho I ho I �-�---1�------l�-�-�1�------1 
I 1-28 I 29-64 I 65-100 IItem A I (28) I (36) I (36) I --------l�------1--------1--------1 
I 1-30 I 31-10 I 11-100 IItem B I (30) I (40) I (30) I-----�-1��----1���-1--------1 
I 1-15 I 16-60 I 61-100 IItem C I (15) (45) I (40) --�----l����l�------l�------1 
I 1-23 I 24-66 rl 61-100 IItem D I (23) I (43) I (34) I ---�---l�--�--l-�-----l�------1 
Item E 
I 1-34 I 35-68 I 69-100 I I C34> I C34> I C32) I 
15 
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and Puto ( 1 982)  and in Huber and Puto ( 1 983 ) , As these results are 
more closely related to this latter work than to information overload 
we shall discuss them in detail elsewhere. We conclude that in general 
subjects do indeed avoid choosing dominated lotteries . 
We next present the results of choices from sets of compound 
lotteries. For these problems each compound lottery was presented as a 
set of simple binary ( i. e. ,  two outcome) lotteries. These problems 
seem a priori to be harder than choices among simple lotteries. For 
example, dominance is more difficult to detect , The problems were 
presented in tabular form (see Appendix Figures Al-AlO) and for payout 
the value of each simple lottery was determined by drawing from the 
bingo cage. The total number of "bits" or pieces of information 
available was varied experimentally by varying the number of items to 
choose from and the number of attributes ( i . e. ,  component lotteries) of 
each , Each set consisted of one dominant lottery and several dominated 
ones. In constructing the lotteries we generally made all but one of 
the component lotteries define identical probability distribution over 
outcomes. For example, in Figure A6 prospects 1 and 3 of item A, 
prospects 1 and 2 of Item B and prospects 1 and 3 of Item C each define 
the same lottery ( $1 .50 with probability .1 8, $1.25 with probability . 27, 
$1 . 1 0 with probability , 22 ,  and $0.85 with probability , 3 3 ) , The sets 
from which the subjects had to choose contained two to five items and 
each item was made up of two to five binary lotteries. In some cases 
all the binary lotteries entailed payments that were roughly the same 
size and in others only one binary lottery per item involved not 
trivial sums of money. By varying the number of component lotteries 
with significant payoffs we hoped to manipulate the number of salient 
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dimensions and in some sense the difficulty of the problem. Note that 
this treatment can be done holding the size of the problem in terms of 
the amount of information presented constant. The basic idea can be 
seen from the following example. 
Choose A or B or indicate indifference. 
$7 p .3 $.2S p .4 
A and 
$S p .7 $.1 0 p .6 
$9 p .4 $.20 p .4S 
B and 
$6 p .6 $.00 p .SS 
It seems evident that B is rather more desirable than A ( in fact it 
dominates it) 6 and 81 percent of our subjects stated a preference for B 
( 237 to S7 with 3 indifferent) ,  Consider on the other hand the 
following problem : 
Choose A or B or indicate indifference, 
A 
B 
$7.00 
$2.00 
$6.SO 
$1 .SO 
p 
p 
p 
p 
.4 
.6 
.4S 
.SS 
and 
and 
$S.OO 
$3 .oo 
$S.SO 
$3 .so 
p 
p 
p 
p 
.7S 
.2S 
.75 
.2S 
Again B dominates A, although intuitively ( at least to us) this is not 
as easy to see as in the previous problem. For the latter problem the 
choice requires considering all four simple lotteries whereas it seems 
1 8  
apparent that two o f  the lotteries in the first problem are essentially 
inconsequential. Indeed, the subjects in our experiments seem to have 
found it more difficult as only 1 7 0  chose B while 121  chose A ( with 1 4  
indifferent) , 
The results are presented in Tables 2 through 6 ,  In the tables 
the number of binary lotteries per item with significant payoffs is 
referred to as the number of dimensions of the problem. Of course we 
are not concerned with the question of precisely how the subjects made 
their decisions or whether or not they viewed the decision problem as 
being of one, two, three, or more dimensions. In fact from Figures Al 
to AlO one can see that there were other aspects of the presentation of 
the choice problems, e.g., the arrangement of the binary lotteries in 
the display, that varied across problems , 
Thus it is apparent that for problems of a given size as 
measured by the pieces of information presented, one can vary the 
degree of difficulty ( as measured by the proportion of correct 
responses) in a systematic way. Table 7 summarizes the ( observed) 
degree of difficulty for problems with a connnon number of "dimensions" 
( salient attributes) according to the overall "size" of the problem, 
Looking down any column, it is clear that whatever determined 
the degree of difficulty of a decision problem, it was not the total 
number of bits of information presented alone. In fact the table 
suggests the most important factor is the number of salient dimensions, 
Holding the number of salient dimensions constant, performance does 
fall off as the total amount of information presented increases (except 
II 
TABLE 2: Two Items - Two Attributes 
Salient Attributes Correct Incorrect 
One Dimension 237 S7 (includes 3 
Proportion ,Sl .19 
Two Dimensions 170 121 (includes 14 
Proportion .ss .42 
Correct Incorrect Total 
One Dimension I 237 I 57 I 294 l------1�----I 
Two Dimensions I 170 I 121 I 291 
Total 407 17S SSS 
oc2 = 34,0> 
19 
indifferent) 
indifferent) 
20 
TABLE 3: Two Items - Three Attributes 
U Salient Attributes Correct Incorrect 
One Dimension 235 59 (includes S indifferent) 
Proportion .so ,20 
Two Dimensions 167 58 (includes S indifferent) 
Proportion .74 .26 
Three Dimensions 123 S6 (includes 6 indifferent) 
Proportion ,5S .42 
Matching Populations Only 
Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total 
One Dimension I 235 I S9 I 294 
1----1----1 
Two Dimensions I 167 I SS I 22S 
Total 402 117 519 
cx2 ., 2 .3S) 
One Dimension I 235 I 59 I 294 
1----1----1 
Three Dimensions I 123 I S6 I 209 
Total 3SS 145 503 
CX2 "'26.S) 
--- ---------
Two Dimensions I 167 I 5S I 225 
1---1 -I 
Three Dimensions I 123 I S6 I 209 
-------.------
Total 290 144 434 
(X2 ., 11.S) 
I l SO I 46 I 226 
1-----1----1 
I 167 I ss I 225 
347 104 451 
cx2 c l .S7) 
I 163 I 46 I 20 ll 
1---1----1 
I 123 I s6 I 20 9 
2S6 132 41S 
cx2 c 17.7) 
----------
I 106 I 34 I 140 
1-----1----1 
I 7S I 63 I 141 
--- -
1S4 97 281 
()(2 "' 12.9) 
II Salient Attributes 
One Dimension 
Proportion 
Two Dimensions 
Proportion 
Three Dimensions 
Proportion 
One Dimension 
Throe Dimensions 
Total 
Two Dimensions 
Three Dimensions 
Total 
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TABLE 4 : Three Items - Three Attributes 
Correct Incorrect 
189 105 (includes 4 indifferent) 
,64 .36 
140 86 (includes 2 indifferent) 
,62 ,38 
8 1  128 (includes 4 indifferent) 
.39 ,61 
Matching Populations Only 
Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total 
------------
18 9 105 I 294 126 83 209 
-I 
81 128 I 209 81 128 209 
270 233 503 207 211 418 
oc2 = 32,0> oc2 = 19.4) 
140 86 226 92 49 I 141 
-I 
81 128 209 51 90 I 141 
----
221 214 435 143 139 282 
oc2 "' 23 .4 > cx2 .. 23 .s > 
II Salient Attributes 
One Dimension 
Proportion 
Four Dimensions 
Proportion 
One Dimension 
Four Dimensions 
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TABLE 5: Four Items - Four Attributes 
Correct Incorrect 
171 123 (includes 2 indi fferont) 
.SB .42 
5 8  151 (includes 13 indifferent) 
.28 .72 
Matching Populations Only 
Correct Incorrect Total Correct Incorrect Total 
171 123 294 I 124 I 85 209 
1 ---1 
58 151 209 I 58 I 151 209 
---------------- - ---------
Total 229 274 503 182 236 418 
cx2 .. 45 .6> cx2 = 42.4> 
U Salient Attributes 
One Dimension 
Proportion 
TABLE 6: Five Items - Five Prospects 
Correct 
170 
.58 
Incorrect 
124 
42 
(includes 11 indifferent) 
23 24 
TABLE 7: 
Percent of Correct Response by Problem Size and Dimension 
II of Items - II of Attributes 
2-2 2-3 3-3 4-4 5-5 
1 Dimension .81 .80 .64 .58 .58 
2 Dimensions .58 .74 .62 
3 Dimensions .58 .39 
4 Dimensions .28 
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in going from two items and two attributes to two items and three 
attributes when two dimensions are salient) ,  but we do not have enough 
data points to conclude that the number of attributes is more important 
than the number of alternatives in generating this effect , Staelin and 
Payne ( 1 975) did conclude that the data from the experiments of Jacoby 
et al. support this conclusion, we cannot yet claim to have confirming 
evidence. 
The effects of increasing the number of salient dimensions are 
clear as is the conclusion that our subjects were generally quite 
capable of ignoring irrelevant information, In only two of the eleven 
problems involving compound lotteries did the percentage of correct 
choices fall below approximately 6 0  percent, including one problem with 
sixteen component lotteries and one with twenty-five component 
lotteries. Observed behavior approached randomness ( but was 
statistically different from it) only when the number of salient 
dimensions and the number of alternatives simultaneously increased. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our experimental results bear on several issues in the consumer 
research literature. In problems involving simple lotteries we found 
our subjects were quite capable of finding undominated choices, but 
they often chose different but undominated items when offered the same 
problem again, or a similar problem with several dominated items added 
to the choice set. These results are interesting when viewed in the 
context of the stochastic choice literature and recent consumer 
research literature ( McAlister, 1 983 ; Huber, Payne, and Puto, 1 982 ; 
Huber and Puto, 1 983 ) ,  
In problems involving compound lotteries our subjects did not 
perform quite as well as they did in the problems involving simple 
lotteries , Admittedly, whether an error rate is high or low is a 
subjective matter, but given that our subjects had no prior training 
with these tasks we feel their performance was still quite good, 
Moreover, Table 7 illustrates quite dramatically that the amount of 
information available is not by itself an adequate measure of problem 
difficulty. The number of salient attributes seems much more 
important. 
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This last observation is of some policy importance. It allows 
us to conclude, for example, that our experiments do not support the 
position that one should restrict the amount of information on product 
labels for fear of overwhelming consumers and thereby producing poor 
brand choices , In fact one could argue that the burden of proof really 
should be on those who claim that information overload is a problem, 
Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein ( 1 982)  argue that judgments about 
risks are collllllonly based on misinformation and badly biased , They 
argue that there is need for providing extra information and 
educational programs to offset the systematic biases that would 
otherwise be present. However the subjects in our experiments acted as 
if they were able to ignore unnecessary bits of information , Thus, if 
for a consumer only a few attributes of a good are important, it 
doesn't follow that providing information on other attributes will be 
dysfunctional. Since the important attributes may vary across people 
this is an encouraging finding. 
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Our study also raises a number of other issues, In particular 
it demonstrates that "information overload, " if it exists, is a poorly 
understood phenomenon. In fact, as it stands, the concept is not even 
well-defined. No perfectly general definition may be possible, 
however, since it is not obvious how one should measure "information 
load." All we know now is that "bits" certainly is not appropriate. 
There are also issues here involving internal versus external 
processing costs ( Bettman, 1 97 9 ) , The former seem more important than 
the latter for our problems, but again, whether this is generalizable 
remains to be seen , 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE Al 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I I I 
I Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I $7.60 if 1 -35 I -$.45 if 1-25 I $4,50 if 1-60 I 
Item A I I I I 
I $3.70 if 36-100 I $.10 if 26-1001 $7.75 if 61-1001 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I $.30 if 1-75 I $8.oo if 1-40 I $3.50 if 1-65 I 
Item B I I I I 
1-$.25 if 76-100 I $5.oo if 41-1001 $7.40 if 66-1001 
I I I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B Don't Care 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value. ____ _ Value. ____ _ Value ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) 
FIGURE A2 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I I I I 
I I I Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
I I h5 .oo if 1-33 lbo.oo if 1-65 l-$10.00 if 1-1001 
I Item A I I I 
I I $0 if 34-100 lb2.oo if 66-1001 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I $4.so if 1-100 lbo.oo if 1-65 1 -$15.00 if 1-67 
I Item B I I I 
I I lb2.oo if 66-1001 $0. if 68-100 
I I I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B Don't Care 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value Value. _____ Value ____ _ · -----
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
29 30 
FIGURE A3 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I 
I I 
I I 
$3.15 if 1-25 $6.25 if 1-55 I $5.75 if 1-35 I 
Item A I I $6.00 if 26-100 b.75 if 56-1001 b.25 if 36-1001 
I I 
I I 
$3.oo I $5.25 if 1-75 I $2.50 if 1-45 if 1-65 
Item B I I $5.50 if 46-100 $6.50 if 66-1001 $2.40 if 76-1001 
I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B Don't Care 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value _____ Value _____ Value ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) -----
31 32 
FIGURE A4 FIGURE AS 
Choose one of the following items: Choose one of the following items: 
I I 
Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 
I I 
I I 
$8.oo if 1-60 I $.7S if 1-3S I $.3s if 1-70 
Item A I I 
$4.7S if 61-1001 $.40 if 36-100 l-$.10 if 71-100 
I I 
I I 
$7.00 if 1-SS 1-$.40 if 1-30 I $1.os if 1-3s 
Item B I I 
$4.SO if S6-lOOI $.os if 31-100 I $.10 if 36-100 
I I 
I I I 
Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I 
I I I 
I I I 
h.so if 1-70 I $s .OS if 1-60 I $6.oo if 1-3S I 
Item A I I I 
ts.as if 11-1001 $ .60 if 61-100 I $3.2S if 36-1001 
I I I 
I I I 
$S.60 if 1-30 I h.20 if 1-6S I $1.9S if 1-70 I 
Item B I I I 
$1.lS if 31-1001 $s.1s if 66-1001 $S.30 if 11-1001 
I I I 
I I I 
$3.0S if 1-6S I $.20 if 1-40 I $6.2S if 1-30 I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: Item C I I I 
$S.90 if 66-1001 $4.6S if 41-1001 h.90 if 31-1001 A B Don't Care I I I 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Indicate your choice by circ ling the appropriate answer: 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ A B c Do n't Care 
Value. _____ Value ______ Value. ____ _ Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) -----
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value _____ Value. _____ Value. ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) -----
FIGURE A6 
Choose one of the following i toms: 
Prospect 1 
$.so If 1-40 
Item A 
$.25 if 41-100 
$.15 if 1 -60 
Item B 
$.40 if 61-100 
1-$.os if 1 -60 
Item C I 
I $.20 if 61-100 
I 
I I 
Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I 
I I 
I I 
$14.00 if 1-25 1$1.00 if 1-45 I 
I I 
$6.00 if 26-1001$.60 if 46-100 I 
I I 
I I 
$.70 if 1-SS 1$5.75 if 1-75 I 
I I 
$1.10 if S6-1ool$1s.oo if 76-1001 
I I 
I I 
$17,00 if 1-25 1$.90 if 1-SS I 
I I 
$8.oo if 26-1001$1.30 if 56-100 I 
I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B c Do n't Care 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value. ____ _ Value. _____ Value. ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) -----
33 34 
FIGURE A7 
Choose one of the following items: 
I I I I 
I Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
1-$.70 if 1 -60 I $9.15 if 1-25 I $7.75 if 1-30 I 
Item A I I I I 
-$.15 if 61-100 I $4.SO if 26-1001 $4.00 if 31-1001 
I I __ I 
I I I 
$7.00 if 1 -70 1-$.os if 1-40 I $4.40 if 1-75 I 
Item B I I I 
$9.oo if 11-1001-$.60 if 41-100 I $9.0S if 76-1001 
I I I 
I I I 
$7.75 if 1-25 I h.oo if 1-30 I h .2s if 1-40 I 
Item C I I I 
$3.1 0 if 26-1001 $s.oo if 31-1001 $.70 if 41-100 I 
I I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B c Don't Care 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value _____ Value. _____ Value. ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3) -----
35 36 
FIGURE AB FIGURE A9 
Choose one of the following items: Choose one of the following items: 
I I I I I l I I I I r Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I Prospect 4 I I Prospect 1 I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I Prospect 4 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I $.45 if 1-30 I $.35 if 1-25 1-$.30 if 1-55 1$16.50 if 1-20 I I $5. 65 if 1-40 I $.75 if 1-60 I $4.40 if 1-45 I $4.15 if 1-30 I Item A I I I I I Item A I I I I $.60 if 31-100 1-$.10 if 26-100 1-$.15 if 56-100 1$10.00 if 21-1001 I $. 80 if 41-100 I $5.85 if 61-1001 $3.65 if 46-1001 $6.05 if 31-1001I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I $.45 if 1-25 1-$.35 if 1-45 1$14.00 if 1-40 I $.10 if 1-70 I I $5.25 if 1-70 I $.35 if 1-60 I $7 .10 if 1-40 I $5.65 if 1-45 I Item B I I I I I Item B I I I I $.00 if 26-100 1-$.50 if 46-100 1$10.75 if 41-1001$.55 if 71-100 I I $3,35 if 71-1001 $5,20 if 61-1001 $1.00 if 41-100 I $4.90 if 46-1001I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I $.80 if 1-30 1$17.00 if 1-40 1-$.25 if 1-75 1-$.50 if 1-55 I I $6.30 if 1-40 I $5.45 if 1-70 I $2.65 if 1-60 I $2.40 if 1-55 I Item C I I I I I Item C I I I I $.95 if 31-100 1$11.00 if 41-1001 $.20 if 76-100 1-$.35 if 56-100 I I $.75 if 41-100 I $3.55 if 71-1001 $7.50 if 61-1001 $3.15 if 56-1001I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I $10.00 if 1-60 l-$.25 if 1-45 I $.65 if 1-70 1-$.05 if 1-75 I I $5,20 if 1-45 I $6.50 if 1-35 I $2.85 if 1-30 I $6.15 if 1-40 I Item D I I I I I I Item D I I I I 1$15.00 if 61-1001-$.40 if 46-100 I $.SO if 71-100 I $.40 if 76-100 I I $4.45 if 46-1001 $1.00 if 36-1001 $4. 75 if 31-1001 $1.30 if 41-1001 I I I I I I I I I I 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B c D Don't Care A B c D Don't Care 
Prospect Prospect 2 Prospect 3 Prospect 4 Prospect l Prospect 2 Prospect 3 Prospect 4 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value. _____ Value, _____ Value, _____ Value. ____ _ Value, _____ Value. _____ Value, _____ Value. ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects l + 2 + 3 + 4) ----- Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3 + 4) -----
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FIGURE AlO 
Choose one of the following items: 
Item A 
Item B 
Item C 
Item D 
Prospect 1 
I I I I 
I Prospect 2 I Prospect 3 I Prospect 4 I Prospect 5 
'------ ' l ______ I _____ _ 
------1 I I I 
$.35 if 1-65 
$.20 if 66-100 
1$18.40 if 1-20 I $.15 if 1-45 I $.60 if 1-25 I $1.05 if 1-60 
I I I I 
1$10.00 if 21-1001-$.20 if 46-100 I $.30 if 26-100 I $.45 if 61-100 
I I I I__ ___ _ ------
1 I I I 
$.30 if 1-40 
$.90 if 41-100 
1$20.25 if 1-30 I $.30 if 1-45 I $.35 if 1-35 I $.15 if 1-75 
I I I I 
1$11.00 if 31-1001-$.05 if 46-100 I $.50 if 36-100 I $.45 if 76-100 
I I I I_____ _ 
------1 I I I 
$.40 if 1-45 1$17.00 if 1-25 I $.85 if 1-35 I $.25 if 1-25 I $.50 if 1-60
I I I I 
$.OS if 46-100 1$10.25 if 26-1001 $1.00 if 36-1001-$.05 if 26-100 1-$.10 if 61-100 
I I I l------
$1.10 if 1-25 1$18.40 if 1-30 1-$.45 if 1-60 I $.70 if 1-65 I $.45 if 1-55 
I I I I 
$.80 if 26-100 1$10.30 if 31-1001-$1.os if 61-1001 $.ss if 66-100 I $.80 if 56-100 
___ ______ I I I I _____ _ 
I I I I 
1-$.15 if 1-75 1$10.oo if 1-70 1-$.95 if 1-40 I $.75 if 1-55 I $1.25 if 1-65 
Item E I I I I I 
I $.15 if 76-100 1$18,75 if 11-1001-$.35 if 41-100 I $1.10 if 56-1001 $1.10 if 66-100 
___ l ______ I I I I, _____ _ 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answer: 
A B c D E Don't Care 
Prospect Prospect 2 Prospect 3 Prospect 4 Prospect 5 
Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ____ Outcome ___ _ 
Value. _____ Value. _____ Value, _____ Value. _____ Value, ____ _ 
Total Value (Prospects 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) -----
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APPENDIX 
INS'raUCTIONS 
This is part of a study of decisionmaking under uncertainty. 
During this session you will make several decisions, At the end of 
the session you will be paid and the amount you earn will depend on 
the decisions you male, After you have made all your decisions, some 
of them will be selected (by chance) and you will be paid based upon 
the outcomes of those decisions. 
If you loot at the front of the room you will see a 
randomizing device otherwise known as a bingo cage, The bingo cage 
contains ten (10) balls numbered 0,1,,,,,9, During the session the 
bingo cage will be used to generate random numbers, The way we shall 
use the cage to generate numbers 1 to 100 is as follows: 
(i) First we spin the cage until a ball comes out, This determines 
the right (units) digit. 
(ii) Next, we replace the ball drawn and spin the cage until a ball 
comes out again, This determines the second (tens) digit. 
For example, if the first ball drawn is a seven (7) and the second 
ball drawn is a three (3) , then the number would be 37. Double zero 
will be counted as 100. If we wish to generate three digit numbers (1 
to 1000), we will continue the same procedure with the third number 
drawn being the hundreds digit (triple zero being counted as 1000), 
etc. 
All the decisions you will make during this 1e11ion will 
involve what we call prospects. A prospect is a list of possible 
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values together with a rule which says how the actual value of the 
prospect will be determined, The values of all prospects will be 
determined by generating a number using the bingo cage, For example, 
a prospect might be the following: 
ho.oo if 1-25 
t 3,00 if 26-100. 
The value of this prospect would be determined by generating a number 
(1 to 100) using the bingo cage as described above. If the number 
generated is 1,2,3,,,,,or 25, the value of the prospect will be $10; 
if the number generated is 26,27,,,,,1 00, the value of the prospect 
will be $3. Thus if the first number drawn is a two (2) and the 
second is a four (4) ,  the number would be 42 and the value of the 
prospect would be $3, Prospects may have more than two possib le 
values and some of the values may be negative. For example: 
$27.00 if 1 -200 
t14.00 if 201-550 
-t6.00 if 551-750 
$3.75 if 751-1000 
Note that in this case the value of the prospect would be determined 
by generating a three digit number using the bingo cage. If the 
number is 477, the prospect is worth $14. If the number is 703, the 
prospect is worth -$6. We will now generate a three digit number and 
ask each of you to determine the value of the prospect. 
Number Value of prospect ------
All decisions you make will involve choosing between prospects 
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or between sets of prospects (which, to keep aimple, we shall just 
refer to as "items"). Thus you will simply have to choose one of 
several items each consisting of one or more prospects, In each 
problem you will be asked to indicate your choice, If you are 
indifferent, you may note this and the choice will be made for you by 
the experimenter using the bingo cage. 
We shall select one individual as a monitor to watch the 
procedure, to examine the equipment, and to make sure that the 
experimenters are really doing what they say they are doing, The 
monitor should check the truthfulness of what the experimenter says, 
but other than that, may not communicate any information to you in any 
way. If the monitor communicates any other information, he or she 
will be asked to leave without payment, The monitor will receive 
$ __ • 
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PART I 
All the decisions in thi s part will be to choos e  a aingle 
prospect from a s e t  of prospect s, As each prospect will typically 
have more than two po ssible value s, and ther e usually will be se veral 
prospe ct s to choo s e  from, we shall adopt a simplified way of 
di splaying the se prospect s ,  In thi s problem the s e t  of po s sible 
value s is the same for all the prospect s, so we have labeled each 
column w ith one of the do llar value s. The follow ing table illu s trate s 
the se di splay s. 
Choo se one of the follow ing items,  
$20 $10 $5 -$5 
Item A 1-30 31-50 51-75  7 6-100 
Item B 1-25 26-50 51-79 80-100 
Item c 1-27 28-50 51-72 73-100 
Item D 1-22 23-37 38-7 2 7 3-100 
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate answe r , 
A B c D don' t care 
Outcome Value of prospect chosen �--� 
If one of the se problems is chose n for payment, then a number 
from l to 100 will be ge nerate d to de termine the value of item A; then
another number will be ge nerated to de termine the value of item B; and
1 0  on until the value of each item has been determined, Your payment 
would be the value of the item you s e lect e d ,  
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PART II 
The decisions in thi s part are similar to those in Part I, The only 
difference is that each of the items will con s i s t  of more than one 
pro spect though the prospect s  will be simpler, each having only two 
po s sible value s ,  Again, for simplicity we shall display the choice s 
in a tabular form. Note that the po s sible value s may differ. 
Example 
Choos e  one of the following items: 
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 3 
$7 if 1-20 $5 if 1-50 0 if 1-30 
Item A 
0 if 21-100 0 if 51-100 -$6 if 31-100 
$20 if 1-25 
Item B $3 . 50 if 1-100 $ 2 . 50 if 1-100 
-$15 if 26-100 
$10 if 1-20 $10 if 1-50 $10 if 1-30 
Item C 
-$3 if 21-100 -$5 i f  51-100 -$16 if 31-100 
Indicate your choice by c i rcling the appropriate an swer, 
A B 
Pro spect s 1 
Outcome __ _ _ 
Value 
c 
Prospe c t s  2 
Outcome __ _ _ 
Value -----
don' t care 
Pro spe c t s  3 
Outcome __ _ _ 
Value 
Total Value (Prospect s 1+2+3) 
If one of the se decisions i s  chose n for payment, then for each 
prospect in each item a number be tween 1 and 100 (or 1 and 1000) mu s t
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b e  genera t e d ,  The payment you would receive would be tho sum of the 
value s of the prospect s in tho item of your choice , 
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FOOTNOTES 
l ,  Bettman also notes, however, that Lussier and Olshavsky ( 1 974) do 
not get this result. One possible explanation is that the crucial 
factor is whether a high rate of internal processing is required , 
Our results tend to support this view. 
2 ,  For example, consider the following typical consumer choice 
problem, Suppose for a given decisionmaker only one or two 
attributes carry much subjective weight. In a random sample of two 
drawn from a set of sixteen attributes, say, it is unlikely that 
either of these attributes will be present. The decisionmaker will 
then need to rely on unimportant attributes in making a choice, and 
it is likely both will be used. Similarly, if a decisionmaker only 
sees four of sixteen attributes, drawn randomly, it is still likely 
that all will be needed to make a choice. But once the "important" 
attributes are in the sample, a choice can be based on them and 
irrelevant information ignored. This will tend to produce an 
inverted u-shaped curve as far as information use is concerned, but 
performance will be monotonically increasing as a function of 
available information,  
3 ,  The notion of dominance we employ in these experiments is quite 
simple. If lottery A can be obtained from lottery B by increasing 
some of the outcomes of lottery B ( in all cases our outcomes are 
dollar values) ,  then lottery A is said to dominate lottery B. 
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Similarly, for a fixed set of outcomes , shifting probability from 
lower valued outcomes to higher valued outcomes will construct a 
superior lottery.  
4 .  These experiments also relate to issues in the so-called "framing" 
literature. See Grether and Wilde ( 1 982)  for details . 
5 .  Not all of the decision problems were presented in tabular form,  
Two sets of problems were given with the lotteries simple written 
out , For each of these problems the results were essentially the 
same as for those using the tabular form of presentation, so we 
subsequently used only the tables for presenting the exercises to 
our subjects as they were easier to work with, especially for the 
complicated problems . It is significant however , that the results 
we obtain do not appear to be an artifact of the method of 
presentation although we have not systematically explored this 
dimension of our experimental design. 
6 ,  Dominance is again defined as in footnote 3 ,  after the compound 
lotteries have been reduced to simple lotteries , 
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